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Background: Game theory enables the predictive study of the behavior of agents that recognize the mutual
interdependence of their decisions and act rationally and strategically to maximize their own gains. In this paper,
the extractivism of pequi (Caryocar coriaceum Wittm.) and fava d’anta (Dimorphandra gardneriana Tul.) in an area
of common use of the semiarid region of northeastern Brazil is described as a model to illustrate a practical
application of game theory in the interpretation of the phenomena analyzed in ethnobiological research.
Methods: Field research was conducted in the Araripe-Apodi National Forest. Semi-structured interviews were
conducted with 55 informants recognized as knowledgeable and experienced in the extractivism of pequi and fava
d’anta in the region. In the interviews, information that could contribute to the identification and understanding
of the focal points of extractivism in the region was surveyed. Data were analyzed under an analytical/descriptive
approach using the “content analysis” technique.
Results: There was a logic of competitive entrepreneurship around the commercial extractivism of pequi and fava
d’anta in the region. Among the extractivists of pequi, one of the main collection rules refers to the prohibition of
removing immature fruits by using sticks or shaking the branches. In the extractivism of fava d’anta, no specific
rules have been established by collectors, but there is a predominant behavior of withdrawing all available fruits
(pods) on a tree in a single visit. In an analysis guided by game theory, the collection decisions adopted by
extractivists to maximize gain from the activity can be considered justifiable from the standpoint of economic
rationality.
Conclusions: The “game of extractivism” of pequi and fava d’anta operates under conditions similar to the
“tragedy of the commons.” In this game, the non-cooperative solution is converted to the Nash equilibrium. The
approach used in this study contributed to the identification of strategies and solutions to problems arising from
the extractivism of pequi and fava d’anta.
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Contexto: A Teoria dos Jogos permite o estudo preditivo do comportamento de agentes que reconhecem a
interdependência mútua de suas decisões e agem de forma racional e estratégica, isto é, com interesse em tomar
decisões ótimas para aumentar os seus próprios ganhos. Neste artigo, o extrativismo de pequi (Caryocar coriaceum
Wittm.) e a fava d’anta (Dimorphandra gardneriana Tul.), em uma área de uso comum na região semiárida do
nordeste do Brasil, é descrito como um modelo para exemplificar uma aplicação prática da teoria dos jogos na
interpretação dos fenômenos analisados em uma pesquisa etnobiológica.
Métodos: A pesquisa de campo foi realizada na Floresta Nacional Araripe-Apodi. Entrevistas semi-estruturadas
foram realizadas com 55 informantes, reconhecidos como experientes conhecedores do extrativismo do pequi e
fava d’anta na região. Nas entrevistas, foram levantadas informações que pudessem contribuir para a identificação e
o entendimento dos pontos focais do jogo do extrativismo na região. Os dados foram analisados por meio de uma
abordagem analítica / descritiva, utilizando a técnica de “análise de conteúdo”.
Resultados: Verificou-se uma lógica de empreendedorismo competitivo em torno do extrativismo comercial de
pequi e fava d’anta na região. Entre os extrativistas do pequi, uma das principais regras de coleta refere-se à proibição
de remoção de frutos imaturos usando varas ou sacudindo os ramos. No extrativismo da fava d’anta não há regras
específicas estabelecidas pelos extrativistas, mas há há um predomínio da retirada todos os frutos (vagens) disponíveis
na árvore em uma única visita. Em uma análise guiada pela teoria dos jogos, considera-se que as decisões de coleta
adotadas pelos extrativistas, a fim de obter um maior ganho da atividade, são justificáveis do ponto de vista da
racionalidade econômica.
Conclusões: O “jogo do extrativismo” de pequi e fava d’anta opera em condições semelhantes à Tragédia dos
Comuns. Neste jogo, a solução não-cooperativa se converte no equilíbrio de Nash. A abordagem utilizada neste
estudo contribuiu para a identificação de estratégias e soluções para os problemas decorrentes do extrativismo
do pequi e fava d’anta.Background
Game theory consists of a theoretical and methodological
framework that allows the study of the behavior of agents
(individuals or groups of individuals) who recognize the
mutual interdependence of their decisions and act ration-
ally and strategically, i.e., with an interest towards making
optimal decisions to increase their own gains [1,2].
Through different theoretical models, game theory enables
a determination of the necessary conditions for producing
the expected results. Overall, this analytical perspective
emphasizes the point of view of economic rationality - an
approach sometimes criticized in studies guided by
other economic aspects influenced by the realization that
rationality is not limited to a question of maximization of
utility but rather depends on the limitations of informa-
tion, standards and evolving mental abilities [3].
In recent applications, game theory has gained greater
popularity in use for evolutionary biology-related studies
[4]. In this vast field, there is a special interest in
explaining the behaviors considered more or less fit [1].
Although many combinations of genes can cause certain
behavioral tendencies, which share their origin in environ-
mental factors at a level that prevents the determination
of genetic or environmental influences on them, in the
context of evolutionary biology, “gain” is considered to
mean reproductive success. Therefore, rational decisions
would be related to strategies that increase reproductivesuccess (gain) of the species, and the evolutionary
process of natural selection would be dominated by
rational decisions [4].
We consider evidence in the field of evolutionary biol-
ogy to serve as important insights for the application of
game theory in the field of ethnobiology. In ethnobiological
research, we seek to understand the theory of evolution
not just in its biological context because rules, codes of
conduct, lifestyles, beliefs, and other human cultural traits
also result in and influence evolutionary processes. In this
context, an important aspect in ethnobiological studies on
the use of plant resources should be the investigation of
competition or cooperation existence, both in resource
collection and marketing used by human populations.
The experiences presented in the scientific literature
allow the consideration that although local populations
often have a rich knowledge of the ecosystems with
which they interact [5,6], which may be linked to their
cultural identity [7], this does not ensure that they will
develop the same practices that contribute to the conser-
vation of the resources used [8,9]. According to Belcher
and Kusters [10], in situations where the extractivists
need to meet their immediate needs for sustenance, they
do not always consider the risks of overexploitation.
Therefore, the following questions arise: in regard to the
search for resources, can game theory help explain
which behaviors have a greater or lesser prevalence in a
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understanding in the search for models of management
of natural resources for human populations and users of
common resources?
In the scientific literature, the most tested and discussed
idea for issues of this nature is known as “the tragedy of
the commons” as coined by Hardin [11]. According to this
author, when a natural resource is in common use, there
is a tendency for competition to lead to exhaustion. This
idea was postulated on an alleged situation that occurred
in Europe in the Middle Ages, where shepherds could
freely feed their sheep on lands without a specific owner.
In this case, the most advantageous outcome for every
shepherd would always be to increase the flock. Assuming
everyone acted in this manner, at some point the common
pasture would be overexploited and soon exhausted.
Consequently, there would be a lack of resources for all
animals, thus leading to a tragedy of the commons. In this
game, the conflict is the decision whether to extensively
use a common resource with an understanding that exten-
sive use will lead to its exhaustion, causing damage to
everyone involved.
The situation described in the classic format of the
tragedy of the commons is a non-cooperative game. In
this game, the best solution for the players would be
achieved through mutual cooperation, management
mechanisms and access regulation to the common re-
source. However, by the logic of economic rationality,
the uncooperative decision (maximizing the flock) repre-
sents the best individual result because the best response
to competitors increasing their flock is to do the same.
Thus, the solution in which all players increase their
flock represents a “Nash equilibrium” [12], which is the
best response in relation to the rational choices of the
other players. It appears that in this game of the com-
mons, the theoretical solution does not correspond to
the best collective result.
Many of the problems related to common resources
management involve situations in which the rational be-
havior for the self-interest of individuals leads to socially
suboptimal outcomes. In this article, we discuss these
problems in the context of extractivism of two important
species of Brazilian sociobiodiversity, pequi (Caryocar
coriaceum Wittm.) and fava d’anta (Dimorphandra gard-
neriana Tul.), in an area of common use in the semiarid
region of northeastern Brazil. We use this case study as
a model to illustrate a practical application of game the-
ory in the interpretation of the phenomena analyzed in
ethnobiological research. In this regard, we assume that
the case study will present an analogous situation to the
“tragedy of the commons” and that extractivists will
adopt specific mechanisms for managing these resources
in order to prevent its exhaustion. We evaluated this
idea in a descriptive way, considering both the relationsamong extractivists and among extractivists and the for-
mal institutions involved in the activities.
Methods
Study area
Field research was conducted in the Araripe-Apodi
National Forest (FLONA) (Figure 1), which is classified
by Brazilian law as a nature conservation unit (NCU)
under the grouping of sustainable use, for which the
basic objective is to match nature conservation with
the sustainable use of its natural resources [13]. In
this region, composed of Cerrado vegetation (Brazilian
Savanna) inserted in the semiarid region of northeastern
Brazil, the Horizonte community (S 07° 29′ 36.9″; W 39°
22′ 02.6″) (Figure 1) was identified as the community
most dependent on the sale of forest products obtained by
plant extractivism. Much of the marketed product is ob-
tained in the FLONA, comprising an area of common use
by the extractivist community.
Approximately 1,120 people reside in the Horizonte
community, but the number of residents varies through-
out the year; due to the limited employment opportunities
available in the region, it is common for people to migrate
to other regions in search of work during some months
of the year. During the period in which the survey was
conducted, there were approximately 462 people over
18 years old in the community according to the infor-
mation reported by residents and provided by local
health workers. Out of this population, it was estimated
that approximately 282 individuals were practitioners of
plant extractivism for commercial purposes. Among these,
the extractivism of pequi (Caryocar coriaceum Wittm.,
Caryocaraceae) and fava d’anta (Dimorphandra gardneri-
ana Tul., Fabaceae) stood out as the most economically
important productive activities to the local people.
The fruits of C. coriaceum are traded in the FLONA
region with food for medicinal purposes both in natura
and processed in the form of oil, which is part of the
local medical, popular and regional culinary traditions.
The economic importance of D. gardneriana is due to
the high content of the flavonoids rutin and quercetin in
its pods; both are widely used by pharmaceutical indus-
tries, which are responsible for the commercial demand
for fava d’anta in the region. Production chains formed
from the extractivism of these two species, their socioeco-
nomic aspects, the dynamics of production and marketing
in the Horizonte community are treated in greater detail
in another publication by the same authors.
Sampling and data analysis
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 55 infor-
mants, among them extractivists, processors, middlemen
and others recognized as knowledgeable and experienced
in the extractivism of pequi (C. coriaceum) and fava d’anta
Figure 1 Location of the study area in the FLONA of Araripe, CE, northeastern Brazil, where▲ = Point of purchase and drying of fava
d’anta; ① = “Barreiro Novo” camp of extractivists of Pequi; and ② “Siriqueira” camp of extractivists of Pequi.
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ered local experts, were selected through nonprobabilistic
sampling by means of an adaptation of the “snowball”
technique [14], in which one informant was interviewed
and requested at the end to indicate other potential infor-
mants, and so on, until the point when the indicated in-
formants or information obtained began to repeat,
indicating field exhaustion. The interviews were con-
ducted in community headquarters such as in extractivist
camps and purchase points associated with activities
(Figure 1).
In the interviews, information that could contribute to
the identification and understanding of the focal points
of the extractivism game in the region was surveyed as a
way of discussing the specific conditions in which the
extractivists, in strategic interaction, tend to adopt cer-
tain behaviors in order to obtain greater success in col-
lecting or greater economic return for the activity. In
addition, direct observations of extractivist activities
were conducted with the presence of the researcher in
the community during harvest periods.Use of the information provided was approved by the
research participants who each signed an informed
consent form in compliance with the requirements of
Brazilian legislation (Resolution No. 466/2012 of the
National Board of Health). Data were analyzed under an
analytical/descriptive approach using the technique of
“content analysis” [15], in which the data were organized,
the content of responses were identified, and inferences
were drawn regarding to the theoretical discussion pro-
posed by the study.
Results and discussion
In general, extractivists have poor socioeconomic condi-
tions with few job options for income generation. This
context weakens the community, which faces difficulties
in organizing production in a cooperative manner to
ensure greater economic benefits and effective control of
the activity. Thus, there was a logic of competitive entre-
preneurship around the commercial extractivism of pequi
(C. coriaceum) and fava d’anta (D. gardneriana.) in the
region.
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history of projects and actions aimed at promoting the
production and marketing of pequi cooperatively in the
community through the implementation of a processing
unit for oil production installed by the Associação de
Moradores de Horizonte. This action was promoted by
an NGO with the support of the UCN management body
among other funders. However, the results were unsatis-
factory because the extractivists involved considered it
more advantageous to produce independently because
they could negotiate prices different from the marketing
values prefixed by the association.
In the case of fava d’anta, a similar pattern was evident,
but it was focused more on the suppliers, i.e., intermediar-
ies hired by the consumer company to organize production.
Although the managing agency of the FLONA requires the
marketing of pods through neighborhood associations, the
“supplier” (intermediate) continues to play a strong role in
the production process. Thus, the requirement does not
fully meet the objective of ensuring greater community
control of the activity, a fact aggravated because the few
suppliers operating in the region (only four), considering
independent action to be more advantageous, do not
express an interest in consolidating an extractivist co-
operative. In this context, during the period of this survey,
the purchasing company also did not develop any action
to ensure a greater bond with or commitment to the
extractivist community, such as long-term contracts.
Among the pequi extractivists, one of the main collec-
tion rules refers to the prohibition of removing imma-
ture fruits by using sticks or shaking the branches. This
practice, generally motivated by an interest for individual
maximization of earnings, is repudiated by most extra-
ctivists under the following allegations:
1. it affects the final consumer by generating a product
of inferior quality to the fruit collected on the ground;
2. it is damaging to other extractivists; and
3. it harms the tree and negatively affects the
production in later years. In the extractivism of fava
d’anta, there are no specific rules established by
collectors, but there was repudiation for felling these
trees or breaking branches when collecting. Among
the collection practices, there is a predominance of
withdrawing all the fruits (pods) available on the
tree in a single visit.
In an analysis guided by game theory, one can consider
the collection decisions adopted by extractivists maximize
individual gain from the activity to be justifiable from the
standpoint of economic rationality. The decision to har-
vest immature fruits, as occurs with pequi, or collect all
the fruits available in the tree, as with fava d’anta, has a
simple explanation: in a context of competition searchingfor the resource, the prevailing thought is, “If I do not do
it, someone else will do it.” [16] However, this choice, when
adopted by all extractivists, tends to increase harvesting
pressure, thus increasing the risk of resource depletion.
Therefore, one can consider that the conditions of the
“game of extractivism” are sufficient for rational agents
to convert to non-cooperation in the Nash equilibrium,
i.e., the best possible response when considering the
decision that other players should take. In this “game,”
the pequi fruits collected from the ground represent the
“cooperative” gain, and the fruits already fallen to the
ground added to the downed fruits represent the unco-
operative gain (maximizing individual return). In the
case of fava d’anta, one can employ the same logic, but
the non-cooperative gain would be represented by the
removal of all pods at collection. In Figure 2, the “game
of extractivism” is represented in a decision tree scheme.
The “game of extractivism” involves numerous players
and occurs in “successive rounds,” making it a social di-
lemma that takes the theoretical dimensions of the tragedy
of the commons game. Based on game theory assumptions,
the cooperative solution (represented in single brackets in
Figure 2) can be considered to be more advantageous in
the case of sharing rules for collecting and ensuring con-
tinuity of the game, hence ensuring greater chances of the
perpetuation of extractivist activity and resource conserva-
tion. The non-cooperative solution (represented in double
brackets in Figure 2), which is a Nash equilibrium in the
described context, would always represent the best solution
whenever the perspective of continuing the game was not
in play and there were no commitments previously estab-
lished among players; however, it leads to greater pressure
on the resource, thereby increasing the chances of activity
decline and, consequently, a “tragedy of the commons.”
The extractivism of pequi usually occurs under a logic
of “successive rounds” because the same tree is collected
over the same crop and the activity will take place over
an indefinite number of crops. Thus, the extractivism of
pequi presents, from the standpoint of economic rationality
applied to game theory, the minimum conditions necessary
for cooperation among players (extractivists). However,
during the final round (e.g., last collection or late harvest),
when the game inevitably occurs in a “single round”, the
rational solution happens to be non-cooperation.
In the extractivism of fava d’anta, the conditions observed
allow for consideration under an analytical perspective
guided by game theory. The activity occurs in a logic of a
single round, as it is usually collected only once per tree,
and there are no guaranteed commitments for purchases in
later harvests or legal mechanisms to ensure a bond be-
tween the company, suppliers and extractivists for purchase
in subsequent years. These extractivists are only informed
about the company’s interest and the quantity to be ordered
in the period before the harvest. Therefore, they do not
Figure 2 Adaptation of prisoners’ dilemma as a “game of extractivism” in the decision tree scheme, in which EXT1 = Extractivist 1 and
EXT2 = Extractivist 2. Note: Outcomes represented in the top row of the pairs presented at the end of the tree are the extractivist 1; the result
highlighted in brackets is the cooperative solution, and the non-cooperative solution is between the double brackets (the fall of immature pequi
fruits or the collection of all the pods of fava d’anta aimed at increasing the individual gains).
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complicates the implementation of strategies including
community management of the species. In this case,
the cooperative solution would only represent a benefit
to the extractivists of fava d’anta by establishing long-term
contracts, which guarantee the continuity of the game
through successive rounds as well as a better distribution
of the benefits from the activity.
Mechanisms that promote cooperation among extra-
ctivists should be prepared in the “game of extractivism.”
According to Ostrom [17], the management of common
goods for long periods can be ensured through the
establishment of institutional arrangements generally
composed of several elements. In the case of extracti-
vism of pequi and fava d’anta, this would entail the
strengthening of associations, negotiation of grants and
policies regarding minimum prices, agreements, rules,
long-term contracts, monitoring and conflict resolution.
In the study area, the regulations imposed by the man-
aging agency (formal rules) and the rules passed down
orally by the owners of collection sites or among extra-
ctivists (informal rules) have apparently contributed to
the control of extractivism. According to Ostrom et al.
[18], submitting extractivism to a set of formal and in-
formal rules can have a positive effect for greater control
of the collection. These authors purport that overexploi-
tation in common areas can be avoided when users have
regulatory mechanisms for collection.
One such case was observed by Yang et al. [19] among
extractivists of “matsutake” mushroom in northwest
Yunnan Province, China, who developed rotating collec-
tion systems, collective management, labor savings and
benefit sharing that reduced the harvest pressure on the
resource to solve the problem of unequal distribution of
resources. Experiences like this serve as evidence thatextractivist activity becomes a viable strategy for conser-
vation of the species when there is organization and
cooperation among the social actors involved.
The repudiation of extractivists from Horizonte/CE for
the practice of felling immature pequi fruits and the
attacks to trees serve as examples of local regulatory
mechanisms of activity. This reinforces our vision that
in a situation analogous to the “tragedy of the com-
mons,” foragers would draw up arrangements for the
management of resources to prevent the exhaustion of
these resources. However, these control rules could not
completely eliminate the assumption of inappropriate
collection practices in the region. In a study conducted
in the same community, Souza-Júnior et al. [20] found
that 19.5% of extractivist respondents claimed to have
collected immature pequi fruits when ripe fruits were
not found on the ground.
It is worth noting that the land status of the main col-
lecting areas in the study area, set in a conservation of
sustainable use area, contributes to the greater control
of activities. The managing agency plays an important
role in regulating and, even if precariously, supervising
the activity. Furthermore, actions that would promote
the production of seedlings and stimulate enrichment
plantation in conservation units by the authorizing agency
may have positive effects on the extractivist economy over
the long term. Such actions, which constitute the manage-
ment of natural populations, may help to ensure that
resources remain available and accessible to extractivism
in the future.
Conclusion
The “game of extractivism” of pequi (Caryocar coriaceum
Wittm.) and fava d’anta (Dimorphandra gardneriana Tul.)
operates under conditions similar to the tragedy of the
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converted to the Nash equilibrium whenever there are no
guaranteed commitments or consideration of future
rounds. The search for the maximization of individual
gains is justified in the context studied, where there are
few job options and strong competition in the search
for extractivist resources in an area of common use.
The implications of this scenario, as with the predictions
of game theory, tend to generate negative outcomes for
community.
In this regard, the case study revealed that those in-
volved in extractive activities have developed specific
mechanisms for the management of resources to prevent
its exhaustion. Although this fact corroborated with our
idea, it does not allow us to infer that the extractive
activity will be insured against the risk of a tragedy of the
commons. Thus, we conclude that “game of extractivism”
of pequi (Caryocar coriaceum Wittm.) and fava d’anta
(Dimorphandra gardneriana Tul.) requires the implemen-
tation of mechanisms capable of making advantageous
collective action and cooperation among stakeholders.
Based on the information generated, it becomes possible
to identify alternative strategies to the problems arising
from this game, which may be important for resource
management in common use.
The approach proposed in this study applies the concepts
of game theory to ethnobiology. This initial experience has
proven to be a practical example of the contribution of
game theory to ethnobiological surveys on extractivist pop-
ulations. Larger, ongoing efforts are necessary to deepen
this understanding in the field of ethnobiology.
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